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A Call to Congress: A Constitutional
Indian Child Welfare Act is Not a Flawless
Indian Child Welfare Act
Maci Burke†
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA),1 to regulate the removal and placement of Indian children
in foster care, the termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement, and adoptive placement.2 The ICWA was enacted “to
address rising concerns over ‘abusive child welfare practices that
resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from
their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement,
usually in non-Indian homes.’”3 The ICWA refers to Native
Americans as “Indians,” thus, I will also refer to Native Americans
as “Indians” to employ consistent language with the ICWA. The
ICWA’s stated purpose is to:
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal
of Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture . . . .4

Unfortunately, Congress’ goals of protecting Indian children
while also maintaining Indian culture sometimes conflict.5 Most
†. J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. English &
Political Science 2018, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. I thank Professor Carol
Chomsky for her guidance and feedback to make this Note the strongest possible. I
am also thankful to the Minnesota Journal of Law and Inequality staff for all their
edits and contributions. Finally, I thank my family and friends, specifically my
mother, Trisha Burke, and my “brother,” Dennis Metcalf, for their unwavering love
and support throughout this process.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
3. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 416 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Miss. Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989)).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
5. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 638 (2013) (holding, in part,
that the ICWA does not protect parents from involuntary termination of parental
rights for Indian children where the parent never had custody of the child); Miss.
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recently, the ICWA has been challenged on Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection grounds in Brackeen v. Bernhardt.6 Brackeen is the
first case challenging the ICWA on equal protection grounds to be
decided in a federal Circuit Court of Appeals.7 In Brackeen, the Fifth
Circuit grappled with the ICWA’s definitional boundaries,
particularly whether the definition of an “Indian child” constitutes
a race-based or political classification.8 Race-based classifications
are subject to strict scrutiny review,9 while political classifications
are subject to rational basis review.10 Because surviving strict
scrutiny review is nearly impossible,11 a holding that the ICWA’s
“Indian child” definition12 is race-based, and subject to strict
scrutiny, would likely result in a court overturning the ICWA in its
entirety.13
While the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas agreed with the plaintiffs in Brackeen, holding the ICWA
unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the
“Indian child” classification is political and constitutional. 14
However, the Fifth Circuit has ordered the case be reheard en
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 51–53 (1989) (holding that
children were domiciled on an Indian reservation despite a parent choosing to give
birth off the reservation to facilitate their adoption by non-Indian parents, and that
they would therefore still be covered under the ICWA umbrella); A.D. by Carter v.
Washburn, 2017 WL 1019685, at *6–8 (2017) (dismissing equal protection challenges
to the ICWA’s active efforts provision, adoptive placement preferences, and burdens
of proof for Indian child removal and termination of parental rights for lack of
standing).
6. See Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 416.
7. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Placement Preferences of State and Federal Indian Child Welfare Acts, 63
A.L.R.6th 429 (cumulative supp.) (originally published in 2011).
8. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 426–29.
9. Id. at 425 (citing Richard v. Hinson, 70 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1995)).
10. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)).
11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 664 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing
the stringency of strict scrutiny); see also Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race,
Membership and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1055 n.57 (2012) (citing
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES 671 (3d ed.
2006)) (“Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged law.”); Douglas
Linder, Levels of Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause, UNIV. MO.-KANSAS
CITY: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/
projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm [https://perma.cc/6J4N-DUSR] (“Usually,
strict scrutiny will result in invalidation of the challenged classification . . . .”).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
13. See Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 426 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552
(1974)) (“If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed
to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of
the U.S. Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of
the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”).
14. Id. at 427–28.
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banc.15 The question of whether the ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child” is a race-based or political classification will remain contested
until the U.S. Supreme Court rules on the question, resolving how
the balance will be struck between protecting Indian culture and
enforcing the best interests of Indian children.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the ICWA,
including the history and policies behind the ICWA’s adoption,
judicial policies that resulted from the ICWA, and the ICWA U.S.
Supreme Court cases. Part II examines the Fifth Circuit holding in
Brackeen v. Bernhardt that the “Indian child” definition is a
political, rather than race-based, classification, and argues that the
Fifth Circuit correctly held that the “Indian child” definition is a
political classification. Part III, however, notes the ICWA’s “Indian
child” definition, although constitutional as a political classification
under the Equal Protection Clause, is flawed, requiring Congress to
revisit the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition.
I.

Background on the Indian Child Welfare Act

The ICWA was implemented in response to a national trend of
Indian children being removed from their homes at disproportional
rates.16
A. The Federal Government’s Historical Treatment of
Indian Children and Culture
But we all survived, though at times the Indianness was almost
beaten out of us.17

Before Congress implemented the ICWA to protect Indian
children and culture, the federal government worked to “[k]ill the
Indian, save the man” by replacing Indian traditional ways of life
with American culture through forcefully removing and placing
Indian children in boarding schools beginning in 1869. 18 All in all,

15. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, No. 18-11479, 2019 WL 5847349 at *1 (5th Cir. Nov.
7, 2019) (per curiam). Oral arguments were heard in January, 2020. Julia Dreyer,
Fifth Circuit Hears Oral Argument on ICWA Case, NAT’L COUNCIL OF URB. INDIAN
HEALTH (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.ncuih.org/policy_blog?article_id=345
[https://perma.cc/BKF3-7DQK].
16. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1 (1977).
17. Jon Reyhner, American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What
is Going Right?, 57 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. 58, 59 (2018).
18. See History and Culture: Boarding Schools, NATIVE PARTNERSHIP,
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the government operated as many as 100 boarding schools.19
Minnesota, for example, had sixteen boarding schools.20 The federal
government left many Indian families no choice but to forfeit
guardianship of their children for months and years on end. 21 Many
argue that the boarding schools were tools of ethnic cleansing. 22 At
these boarding schools, Indian children were stripped of their
Indian identities, forced to cut their hair, made to surrender their
traditional clothing, forbidden from speaking their languages, told
to forget their traditional religions, and taught about White
American history.23 Indian children “were taught that their
cultures were inferior.”24 Additionally, the children were often
physically and sexually abused.25 And rather than returning the
Indian children home to their families and tribes, “[i]t became
standard policy . . . to adopt them out to white families, all with an
eye toward white acculturation.”26
After decades of such cruelty, Congress took some
compensatory steps by enacting the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) of 1934. The purpose of the Act was to “conserve and develop
Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the right to form
http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/PageServer?pagename=airc_hist_boardingsc
hools [https://perma.cc/PH9L-AS9E] (quoting Col. Richard Henry Pratt, founder of
the Carlisle Indian School); Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt
Many,
NPR
(May
12,
2008),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=16516865 [https://perma.cc/H6FZ-3NY5] (further quoting Pratt,
who stated that “[a] great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead
one . . . [.] In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian
there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man.”).
19. See Bear, supra note 18.
20. See Denise K. Lajimodiere, The Sad Legacy of American Indian Boarding
Schools in Minnesota and the U.S., MINNPOST (June 14, 2016),
https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2016/06/sad-legacy-american-indianboarding-schools-minnesota-and-us/ [https://perma.cc/XA8W-YBS4].
21. See Boarding Schools, NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AM. INDIAN,
https://americanindian.si.edu/education/codetalkers/html/chapter3.html
[https://perma.cc/4GFM-A5JG].
22. See, e.g, Reyhner, supra note 17, at 72.
23. See id.; Boarding Schools, supra note 21.
24. Boarding Schools, supra note 21.
25. Dan Gunderson, ‘I’ve Never Told Anyone’: Stories of Life in Indian Boarding
Schools, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/
story/2019/10/03/stories-of-life-in-indian-boarding-schools [https://perma.cc/Q3GTQRBJ] (“She started whispering about being sexually abused and she said, ‘I don’t
know why I’m telling you. I have not told anybody.’ Almost every survivor in the book
experienced sexual abuse, or they witnessed it.”).
26. See Lia Kvatum, Who Should Get to Adopt Native American Children?,
WASH. POST MAG. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/
wp/2019/04/03/feature/who-should-get-to-adopt-native-american-children/
[https://perma.cc/CG48-AQMY] (quoting Matthew Fletcher, a Tribal Law expert and
an Anishinaabe Indian).
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business and other organizations; to establish a credit system for
Indians; to grant certain rights of home rule to Indians; [and] to
provide for vocational education for Indians . . . .” 27 The IRA,
however, still required Indians to replace their traditional ways of
life by adopting White American culture.28 In fact, Indian historians
have argued that “[t]he IRA was the last great drive to assimilate
the American Indian. It was also a program to colonize the tribes.”29
B. Indian Child Welfare Act Statutory Provisions
In 1978, after over a century of Indian children being removed
from their families and culture, Congress responded by enacting the
Indian Child Welfare Act.30 In enacting the ICWA, Congress
recognized that a disproportionate number of Indian children were
“separated from their natural parents through the actions of
nontribal government agencies or private individuals or private
agencies . . . .”31 In particular, Congress found that in 1974
“approximately 25–35 percent of all Indian children are separated
from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or
institutions.”32 Thus, the ICWA was enacted “to protect the rights
of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.”33
i.

Definitions

The ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian
tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]”34 The ICWA does
not define tribal membership eligibility requirements. Further,
27. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 5101).
28. See 1934: President Franklin Roosevelt Signs the Indian Reorganization Act,
NATIVE
VOICES,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nativevoices/timeline/452.html
[https://perma.cc/JKF2-JBD5] (“[I]n general the new tribal constitutions and bylaws
were standardized and largely followed the Anglo-American system of organizing
people. Traditional Indians of almost every tribe strongly objected to this method of
organizing and criticized the IRA as simply another means of imposing white
institutions on the tribes.”).
29. See Tim Giago, Good or Bad? Indian Reorganization Act Turns 75,
HUFFPOST: BLOG (Sept. 13, 2009), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/good-or-badindian-reorga_b_284940 [https://perma.cc/7VB7-SKGY] (quoting Rupert Costo,
Cahuilla historian, publisher, and journalist).
30. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
31. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1 (1977).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).
33. Id. at 23.
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
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“Indian tribe” is defined as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for
the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their
status as Indians . . . [.]”35
ii. Jurisdiction over ICWA Proceedings
The ICWA imposes jurisdictional limits on “Indian child”
custody proceedings. Indian tribes have sole jurisdiction regarding
child custody proceedings over Indian children that fall within the
definition of “Indian child” that are “domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is
otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” 36 A state
court lacks jurisdiction regarding foster care placement or
termination of parental rights “in the absence of good cause to the
contrary . . . .”37 If, however, a state court begins a legal proceeding
regarding a foster care placement or termination of parental rights
of an “Indian child,” then that Indian child’s tribe has the right to
intervene in the proceeding at any point.38 Thus, to avoid tribal
intervention in an involuntary state court proceeding regarding
foster care placement or termination of parental rights, courts are
required to notify the Indian child’s family and tribe.39
iii. Placement Preference
The ICWA contains strict placement preferences for Indian
families. In the event parents aim to put their child up for adoption,
the parents’ tribe may intervene and override their expressed
wishes under the ICWA.40 An “Indian child” up for adoption, “in the
absence of good cause to the contrary,” shall be placed with: “(1) a
member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the
Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”41 Likewise, strict
placement preferences are implemented for “Indian child” foster
care and preadoptive placements.42
35. § 1903(8).
36. § 1911(a).
37. § 1911(b).
38. Id.
39. § 1912(a).
40. § 1911(c) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child
and the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the
proceeding.”); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
41. § 1915(a).
42. These preferences are as follows:
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C. Tribal Enrollment Requirements
Tribal enrollment requirements can broaden the number of
“Indian children” and the scope of the ICWA. The U.S. Supreme
Court has “recognized that Indian tribes have a right to define tribal
membership as each tribe sees fit.”43 Historically, tribes have
embraced eligibility mechanisms such as “[l]anguage, residence,
cultural affiliation, recognition by a community, degree of ‘blood,’
genealogical lines of descent, and self-identification . . . .”44 Blood
quantum is now the most generally used eligibility mechanism to
determine tribal membership.45 For example, the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe requires a one-quarter blood quantum for tribal
membership eligibility.46 Conversely, the Cherokee Nation does not
rely on blood quantum. The tribe requires that the individuals must
be either original enrollees listed on the Dawes Commission Rolls
or descendants of said enrollees.47 Although many tribal eligibility
requirements are more stringent than the Cherokee Nation’s, tribes
will likely amend their tribal eligibility requirements in the near
future, making their eligibility requirements more lenient as blood
quanta continue to dilute due to intermarriage.48 Thus, as time
persists and tribes amend their tribal eligibility requirements, more
and more Indian children will fall subject to the ICWA’s “Indian
child” definition.
(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian
licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by
an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian
child’s needs.
§ 1915(b).
43. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
44. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, CHANGING NUMBERS, CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN
INDIAN DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 105 (Gary D. Sandefur, Ronald R.
Rindfuss & Barney Cohen eds., 1996).
45. Id. at 106 (“Individuals enrolled in federally recognized tribes also receive a
Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood . . . from the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
specifying a certain degree of Indian blood, i.e., a blood quantum.”).
46. MINN. CHIPPEWA TRIBE ENROLLMENT ORDINANCE § IV(A)(3) (2003).
47. CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Dawes Rolls, NAT’L ARCHIVES
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/dawes/tutorial/
intro.html [https://perma.cc/8WD7-TDBJ] (Dawes Rolls “are the lists of individuals
who were accepted as eligible for tribal membership in the ‘Five Civilized Tribes’:
Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles.”).
48. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 44 (“[I]t has been projected that within the
next century, the proportion of those with a one-half or more blood quantum will
decline to only 8 percent of the American Indian population, whereas the proportion
with less than one-fourth blood quantum will increase to around 60 percent.”).
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D. The Existing Indian Family Exception
Although the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” has not been
amended since its enactment in 1978, states have attempted to limit
its scope through the judicially-created “existing Indian family”
exception.49 This exception originated in a 1982 Kansas Supreme
Court case, In re Baby Boy L., where the court held that the ICWA
did not apply to the proceeding because the ICWA’s purpose is to
protect an existing Indian family, and that Baby Boy L. was not part
of an existing Indian family because his Indian father never had
custody of him.50 After In re Baby Boy L., several more states
adopted the “existing Indian family” exception,51 but Kansas has
since overturned its precedent.52 In one case in particular, In re
Bridget R., a California Court applied its own version of the existing
family exception, holding that the ICWA was unconstitutional if its
application was based solely on racial classification, but that it
could be upheld if its application was based on race and other
factors.53 Thus, the ICWA was constitutional if its application was
based not only on a child’s race but also whether the biological
parents maintain a “significant social, cultural, or political
relationship with the Tribe.”54 However, In re Bridget R. has been
superseded and is no longer good law in California.55
The “existing Indian family exception” has been subject to
much disagreement among the states. The exception is still valid
law in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and
Tennessee.56 In 2016, the Department of Interior expressly rejected
the exception.57 The existence and use of the exception illustrates
widespread attempts to limit the ICWA’s application, while its
49. See ICWA Guide Online: Topic 1. Application, NAT’L INDIAN L. LIBR.,
https://narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/faq/application.html
[https://perma.cc/KF9U6QYC].
50. In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 174–75 (Kan. 1982).
51. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); In re Morgan, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1997); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995); C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837
S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
52. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009) (abandoning the court’s application
of the Existing Indian Family Exception due to the conflict between the exception
and the ICWA language).
53. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
54. Id. at 1491.
55. In re Vincent M., 150 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(abandoning the court’s application of the Existing Indian Family Exception).
56. See supra note 51.
57. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 114, 38782 (June 14,
2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23) (stating that the existing Indian family
exception “has no basis in ICWA’s text or purpose”).
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rejection in other states shows such limitations remain
controversial. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, however, presents the U.S.
Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve both the growing
definitional issues and the validity of the existing Indian family
exception.58
E. United States Supreme Court ICWA Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court has heard two cases involving the
ICWA.59 These cases, Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
(Holyfield) and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (Adoptive Couple),
were decided over two decades apart. The cases illustrate the
Court’s changing views of the ICWA’s applicable scope.60
In Holyfield, an unwed mother and father, both enrolled
members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, conceived
twins.61 However, the couple purposefully gave birth over two
hundred miles away from the reservation and voluntarily placed
the twins up for adoption.62 The twins were adopted by a non-Indian
couple and soon after, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
tribe intervened, moving to vacate the adoption decree on grounds
that under the ICWA, tribal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction
regarding Indian children.63 The biological parents argued that the
ICWA did not apply because the children were born off of the
reservation, and thus were never domiciled on the reservation as
the Act requires.64 Domicile is not defined in the ICWA, and
therefore the Court considered the domicile definition, ultimately
holding that the twins were domiciled on the reservation, and that
the Tribe had jurisdiction.65 Here, the ICWA overrode the parents’
wishes to put their children up for adoption. The Court’s broad
interpretation of domicile strengthened tribal rights under the
ICWA by allotting tribal jurisdiction over a larger range of “Indian
children.”
58. See Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).
59. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
60. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51–53 (broadening the ICWA’s scope by adopting an
expansive definition of “domicile,” giving Indian tribes jurisdiction over more Indian
child proceedings); Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 649–51 (narrowing the ICWA
application of termination of parental rights by holding, in part, that the ICWA does
not protect parents from involuntary termination of parental rights for Indian
children where the parent never had custody of the child).
61. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32.
62. Id. at 37, 51.
63. Id. at 38.
64. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 53.
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Conversely, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Court
restricted some tribal powers under the ICWA. In Adoptive Couple,
a baby girl who was 1.2% Cherokee was classified as an “Indian
child” under the ICWA because she met the Cherokee tribe’s
eligibility requirement.66 The child’s biological mother and father
were unwed, and the biological father was a member of the
Cherokee Nation.67 The biological father, even though capable,
provided no financial assistance to the biological mother or child.68
The biological father relinquished his parental rights via text
message before the child’s birth.69 The biological mother voluntarily
put the child up for adoption, and the child was adopted by a nonIndian couple.70 The biological father objected to the adoption on
grounds that ICWA §§ 1912(d)71 and (f)72 bar the termination of his
parental rights.73 The Court rejected the biological father’s
arguments because § 1912(f) applies to situations of “continued
custody,” but here, the biological father never had custody of the
child.74 Additionally, § 1912(d) “applies only in cases where an
Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the termination
of the parent’s rights.”75 Here, the biological mother and father were
already separated; therefore, the breakup had “long since
occurred.”76
Unlike in Holyfield, in Adoptive Couple, the Court limited the
ICWA’s applicability by applying a narrow reading of the Act’s
provisions. While Adoptive Couple does not overturn Holyfield, it
indicates that the Court may have changed its perception of the
ICWA’s scope. As more constitutional challenges to the ICWA arise,

66. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 641 (2013).
67. Id. at 643–44.
68. Id. at 637.
69. Id. at 643.
70. Id. at 643–44.
71. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1978) (“Any party seeking to effect a foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law
shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”).
72. § 1912(f) (“No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”).
73. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 647.
74. Id. at 648.
75. Id. at 651.
76. Id. at 652.
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such as that in Brackeen v. Bernhardt, how the Court interprets the
ICWA’s scope may determine the Act’s constitutionality.
II. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Holding in Brackeen
v. Bernhardt Should Be Upheld upon the Rehearing en
Banc
This section does two things. First, it outlines the District
Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s holdings as well as explains racebased and political classifications. Second, it argues that the Fifth
Circuit should uphold its decision upon its rehearing of Brackeen en
banc because statutory text, legislative history, and prior U.S.
Supreme Court case law support the Fifth Circuit’s original decision
holding the definition of “Indian child” is a political classification
and therefore constitutional.
The Brackeen plaintiffs consisted of three families seeking
adoption of Indian children who were denied because the children
fell under the ICWA umbrella.77 The three couples struggling to
adopt Indian children brought a Fifth Amendment equal protection
challenge to the ICWA, arguing that the ICWA’s definition of
“Indian child” is a race-based classification and therefore
unconstitutional.78 Underlying the plaintiffs’ argument in Brackeen
is the idea that the definition of “Indian child” is overly broad and
does not effectively work in the best interests of the child or of
Indian culture as Congress originally intended. The District Court
held that the ICWA’s definition of an “Indian child” is race-based,
and therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.79 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the District Court’s decision, holding that the ICWA’s “Indian child”
definition was a political classification, and therefore, subject to
rational basis review.80 This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s
original holding should be affirmed when it is reconsidered en banc.
A. Political Classifications v. Race-Based Classifications
Challenges under equal protection analysis are considered
under strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis
review, depending on the nature of the classification.81 Race-based

77. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 418–20 (5th Cir. 2019).
78. Id. at 425–26.
79. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 534 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
80. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 429.
81. Kristapor Vartanian, Equal Protection, 9 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 495, 498
(2008). Some argue there is also a “fourth level of scrutiny, ‘rational basis with bite.’”
Id. at 531 (citation omitted).
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classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review,82 while political
classifications are subject to rational basis review.83 In Brackeen,
the District Court and the Fifth Circuit classified the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” differently. The Northern District of
Texas District Court based its race-based classification holding on
the premise that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a
“blanket exemption for Indians,”84 which mirrors Rice v. Cayetano,
not Morton v. Mancari. In Rice, the Court overturned a Hawaiian
voting statute which restricted voter eligibility to only “native
Hawaiians” and those with Hawaiian ancestry for positions in a
state agency.85 The Rice Court held that the voting preference “used
ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose.”86 In
Mancari, a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Indian hiring preference
which “applies ‘only to members of “federally recognized” tribes,’”
and “operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be
classified as ‘Indians,’”87 was upheld as a political classification.88
The U.S. Supreme Court limited the Mancari holding, recognizing
that applying its decision more broadly would raise the “obviously
more difficult question that would be presented by a blanket
exemption for Indians.”89 Because an Indian child may be
considered an “Indian child” under the ICWA’s definition due to
tribal eligibility,90 rather than actual tribal affiliation,91 the District
Court found that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” “uses
ancestry as a proxy for race”92 and is, therefore, a race-based
classification, like Rice.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a political classification,
subject to rational basis review.93 The Fifth Circuit employed four
main arguments. First, Congress maintains broad power to
regulate Indians and Indian tribes both on and off the reservation.94
82. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
83. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 429.
84. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554
(1974)).
85. Id. at 532.
86. Id. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)).
87. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
88. Id. (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
89. Id. at 533 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554).
90. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
91. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538 (1974) (stating the BIA hiring preference that
was based on tribal affiliation).
92. Zinke, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 534.
93. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 429 (5th Cir. 2019).
94. Id. at 428.
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Second, the “eligibility” qualifier in the ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child” does not subject all Indian children to the ICWA’s
jurisdiction; therefore, the “Indian child” definition is not based
solely on tribal ancestry or race.95 Because the ICWA reserves
Indian tribes the right to determine tribal eligibility requirements,
tribes have the freedom to determine to whom they offer
membership. Thus, tribes may elect to admit members without
Indian blood, or tribes may choose to not admit certain Indian
persons because they do not fall within the tribal membership
requirements. Third, the ICWA, unlike the voting preference law in
Rice, is a federal law congressionally enacted to protect Indian
children and tribes.96 Fourth, the state election preferences in Rice
were state affairs, while ICWA adoption proceedings are affairs
involving states, tribes, and Congress.97 Due to these
considerations, the Fifth Circuit overturned the District Court
decision and held that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a
political classification subject to rational basis review.98
The courts’ different decisions classifying the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” are crucial because whether the
definition is classified as race-based or political is dispositive. Under
the Equal Protection Clause, political classifications are subject to
rational basis review, while race-based classifications are subject to
a higher standard of review, strict scrutiny review.99 Application of
strict scrutiny review requires courts to determine whether the
classification at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.100 Surviving strict scrutiny review is nearly

95. Id. at 429.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))
(repudiating “‘[d]istinguishing between citizens solely because of their ancestry,’ as
being ‘odious to a free people . . .’” and emphasizing that, therefore, “the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most
rigid scrutiny’”). See also Bernhardt, 937 F.3d. at 425 (explaining that while
challenges to a state statute on equal protection grounds are brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, challenges to a federal statute on equal protection grounds
are brought under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, in which the Equal
Protection Clause is implicitly included).
100. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (referencing
Fillilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (concurring opinion)) (“Our action
today makes explicit [that] . . . Federal racial classifications, like those of a State,
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to
further that interest.”).
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impossible.101 Conversely, a statute is considered a political
classification if it is based on political characteristics and legitimate
non-racial goals, such as protecting tribal sovereignty. 102 Political
classifications are subject to rational basis review.103 Rational basis
review only requires a rational justification for the statutes be
provided—it is a low bar.104 Thus, a holding that the ICWA’s “Indian
child” definition is a racial classification will likely find the ICWA,
in its entirety, unconstitutional, whereas its classification as
politically-based will preserve the Act’s constitutionality.105
B. The ICWA’s “Indian Child” Definition Is a Political
Classification
Despite the ICWA’s faults, this Article concludes that the
“Indian child” definition is a political rather than a racial
classification.106 The Fifth Circuit correctly examined U.S. Supreme
Court precedent and the history of government special treatment of
Indian affairs in Brackeen v. Bernhardt.107 The ICWA’s statutory
text, legislative history, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent support
the Fifth Circuit’s initial holding that the ICWA’s “Indian child”
definition is a political classification.
i.

Statutory Text

The ICWA’s statutory text advances the argument that the
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a political, not racial,
classification. The ICWA states “that Congress . . . has assumed the
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes
and their resources”108 and that the ICWA’s purpose is to “protect
the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability

101. See discussion supra note 11.
102. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (classifying a BIA hiring
preference as politically-based because the “preference is reasonably and directly
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal”).
103. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 425.
104. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (applying rational basis
review and upholding a statute because defendant must only show that the statute
is rational).
105. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 426 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552) (“If these laws,
derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians,
were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States
Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the
Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”).
106. See id. at 429.
107. Id. at 426–29.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2).
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and security of Indian tribes and families . . . .”109 These statements
establish Congress’ broad interest and assertion of duty to Indian
culture and welfare that motivated the ICWA’s enactment. It is
these non-racial goals that were the driving force leading to the
enactment of the ICWA.
The operative provisions of the statute reflect the same nonracial purpose. First, the ICWA favors placement with extended
family and tribal members so placements “reflect the unique values
of Indian culture . . . .”110 Family is a core element in Indian
cultures.111 In many Indian communities, the responsibilities of
educating and caring for youth is shared by parents, extended
family, and the entire community.112 Indian homes are often
multigenerational, housing great-grandparents, grandparents,
parents, and children.113 Retaining children within their extended
family and tribe is of utmost importance to Indian cultures.114
Accordingly, the ICWA’s placement preferences help Congress
achieve its goal to protect and promote stability in Indian culture.
Second, the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” allots tribes,
rather than Congress, discretion to identify parameters for defining
an “Indian child.”115 The definition states that a child will be
considered an “Indian child” if the child meets tribal eligibility
requirements.116 The ICWA, however, does not define tribal
eligibility requirements. Each tribe maintains discretion to
determine its own tribal membership requisites. “Among tribal
nations in the U.S., many different enrollment requirements

109. Id. § 1902.
110. Allison Krause Elder, “Indian” as a Political Classification: Reading the
Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 417, 421
(2018) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902).
111. See Paul Boyer, Young and Old Alike: Children and the Elderly Are a Priority
in Native American Cultures, 3 J. AM. INDIAN HIGHER EDUC. 4 (1992),
https://tribalcollegejournal.org/young-alike-children-elderly-priority-nativeamerican-cultures/ [https://perma.cc/97DE-TWQY] (describing some typical family
dynamics in Indian cultures).
112. Id.
113. Living Conditions, NATIVE AM. AID, http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=naa_livingconditions [https://perma.cc/L6T4-7DUE].
114. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9–10 (1978).
115. The ICWA does not set tribal membership requirements, so part (b) of the
“Indian child” definition may be as expansive as tribes desire. See 25 U.S.C. §
1903(4).
116. Id.
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exist,”117 including blood quantum,118 lineal descendancy,119 and
residency.120 As discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Brackeen, tribes
may restrict or extend membership to any spectrum of children:
children without any Indian blood may be extended tribal
membership and children with one-quarter Indian blood quantum
may be denied membership.121 The ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child” is not a hardline racial or ancestral limitation and is,
therefore, not a racial classification. Additionally, offering Indian
tribes a voice in defining their people recognizes tribes’ sovereignty,
promoting the stability of Indian tribes.
Third, Congress secured Indian tribes the right to intervene
and reverse a mutually settled adoption of an “Indian child,” further
protecting tribal sovereignty and cultural connection. 122 To ensure
the right of intervention, the ICWA mandates that tribes be notified
upon custody hearings involving “Indian children.”123
Congress’s political intentions for the ICWA were clear—
remedying years of separation of Indian children from their culture,
which tarnished Indian culture and sovereignty. Each of the three
aforementioned ICWA provisions set Congress’s goals for the ICWA
and Indian culture in motion. Therefore, Congress not only “talked

117. Jessica Bardill, Tribal Sovereignty and Enrollment Determinations, AM.
INDIAN & ALASKA NATIVE GENETICS RES. CTR., http://genetics.ncai.org/tribalsovereignty-and-enrollment-determinations.cfm [https://web.archive.org/web/2020
0129090559/http://genetics.ncai.org/tribal-sovereignty-and-enrollmentdeterminations.cfm].
118. CROW CREEK SIOUX TRIBE CONST. art. II, § 2 (“Any child, of one-fourth (1/4)
or more Indian blood born to any member of the Tribe who at the birth of such child
resided on the reservation shall be entitled to membership.”).
119. CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“All citizens of the Cherokee Nation
must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on the Dawes
Commission Rolls . . . .”); Bardill, supra note 117 (describing the Cherokee Nation’s
tribal membership requirement).
120. Bardill, supra note 117 (“A residency rule requires that the tribal member
live within, maintain a residence, or have an allotment among the tribal lands . . . .
The Cedarville Rancheria, Modoc County, Cedarville, California appears to be the
only U.S. tribe that still maintains a residency requirement, in combination with a
lineal descent requirement, for members.”).
121. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 428 (5th Cir. 2019).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (“Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster
care placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or
Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian child’s
tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon
a showing that such action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913
of this title.”).
123. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (“[W]here the court knows or has reason to know that an
Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian
custodian and the Indian child’s tribe . . . .”).
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the talk” but also “walked the walk” by designing the ICWA to
reflect their political rather than racial purposes.
ii. Legislative History
The ICWA’s legislative history bolsters the argument that the
ICWA’s “Indian child” definition is a political classification. Prior to
the ICWA’s passage, Congress discussed and documented the
importance of protecting Indian children and the Indian
community,124 noting that Indian children are placed in foster care
or in adoptive homes five times more frequently than non-Indian
children, sometimes due to ignorance of Indian familial cultural
values and social norms.125 A House Report discusses the
circumstances that affect Indians, which inspired legislative action
through the ICWA.126 Similarly, a Senate Hearing reviewing the
implementation of the ICWA echoes the House Report statements,
confirming the purpose of the ICWA is to protect Indian children as
well as ongoing traditions and cultures of the tribes and families.127
As aforementioned in the discussion of the statutory text, Congress
delegated Indian tribes the right to define what constitutes an
“Indian child,” and therefore, the statute does not racially classify
all children that maintain Indian blood or Indian ancestry as
“Indian children.” Thus, Senate and House discussion regarding the
protection of “Indian children” is not race-based, but political
because the legislative materials, like the ICWA’s statutory text,
discuss “Indian children” with the definitional understanding that
the ICWA applies only to those children that fit within the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child.”
Further, the House Report documents that the Committee of
Interior and Insular Affairs and Department of Justice considered
the potential Fifth Amendment Equal Protection issue regarding
the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” before the ICWA was
enacted. Then Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald raised
a series of potential concerns regarding the ICWA to the House
Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs, including whether the
“Indian child” definition was a racial classification and, therefore,
subject to strict scrutiny. However, Wald concluded that:

124. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9–10 (1978).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 8–10.
127. Oversight on the Implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong. 1–2 (1984) (statements
by Senator Mark Andrews, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs and John W.
Fritz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Bureau of Indian Affairs).

208

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 39: 1

[t]his problem has been, for the most part, eliminated in the
subcommittee draft, which defines ‘Indian child’ as ‘any
unmarried person who is under age 18 and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.’128

It is telling that the legislators and the Department of Justice
considered but dismissed the potential Fifth Amendment equal
protection issue because it shows they did not think it was a valid
concern. The Fifth Circuit should follow Wald’s lead, finding the
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” as a political, not racial,
classification.
iii. Prior Case Law that Supports the Fifth Circuit’s
Decision
Beyond Brackeen v. Bernhardt, no other cases have decided
whether the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a racial
classification.129 The U.S. Supreme Court has, however, addressed
issues regarding racial classifications, specifically in Morton v.
Mancari and Rice v. Cayetano, which support finding that the
definition of “Indian child” is politically-based.130 As
aforementioned, Mancari and Rice present two different holdings,
and Mancari controls in Brackeen.
In Morton v. Mancari, plaintiffs alleged that employment
preferences for qualified Indians in the BIA, as provided in the IRA
of 1934, constituted race-based classifications and discrimination,
violating the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 131 The Court
disagreed with the plaintiffs, holding the BIA Indian hiring
preference was a political classification, subject to rational basis
review.132 To justify the holding, the Court examined the legislative
history behind the hiring preferences, determining the purpose was
to “give Indians a greater participation in their own self128. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 39 (1978).
129. But see A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, 2017 WL 1019685, *1–2, 11 (2017)
(“[A]dult Plaintiffs and those who have undertaken to speak for the child Plaintiffs
attempt to challenge parts of the [ICWA] as unconstitutional racial
discrimination . . . . [A]ll of the pending motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint
will be granted, and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and lack of standing.”).
130. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974).
131. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537.
132. Id. at 554–55.
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government; to further the Government’s trust obligation toward
the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect of having nonIndians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.”133 Thus,
the Court found that the tribal sovereignty goal behind the BIA
hiring preference aligns with political classifications.134 Like the
Mancari BIA hiring preference, the ICWA’s “Indian child”
definition implicates tribal sovereignty. Without culturally
connected Indian youth, tribes will cease to exist, undermining the
existence of tribal sovereignty. The ICWA’s purpose of preserving
Indian culture should, therefore, align with political classifications.
Additionally, like the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition, the
Mancari hiring preference was enacted as part of a federal act, the
IRA of 1934.135 A court holding that either the BIA Indian hiring
preference or the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition are racial
classifications would completely overturn both Acts, not solely
challenged provisions.136 Even further, as the courts in Mancari and
Brackeen state, overturning the ICWA as a race-based classification
would call into question an entire Title of the U.S. Code, and
damage the federal government’s relations with Indians as it calls
into question Indian welfare altogether.137
Congress enacted the IRA and the ICWA due to the “belief that
institutional changes were required.”138 Both Acts were a response
to U.S. governmental behavior that exploited and destroyed Indian
interests.139 Like the Mancari BIA hiring preference, which was
established with the goal to improve Indian welfare through
increased sovereignty, the ICWA was established to preserve
Indian culture through future generations of children. Thus, the
ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” and the BIA hiring preference
were enacted for reasons beyond race.140
The Mancari Court noted that the BIA Indian hiring
preference statute is a “provision applying to a very specific

133. Id. at 541–42.
134. Id. at 555.
135. Id. at 542.
136. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 426 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mancari,
417 U.S. at 552).
137. Id.
138. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
139. Id. at 541 (stating that the purpose of the BIA Indian hiring preference was
to instill greater Indian participation in their own government); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 95-1386 (1978), at 8 (stating the purpose of the ICWA).
140. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 (“Here, the preference is reasonably and directly
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal.”).
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situation”—protecting tribal sovereignty.141 Although the ICWA
does not explicitly justify its enactment in relation to Indian tribal
government sustainability, protecting and preserving Indian
culture through Indian children is effectively related to tribal
sovereignty. Indian children are future tribal leaders. Without
Indian children connected to their Indian tribes, tribal sovereignty
is temporary. So, the ICWA’s goal to preserve and cultivate Indian
culture is political.
Unlike the Mancari BIA Indian hiring preference, which is
limited to Indians applying for BIA positions, the ICWA’s “Indian
child” definition is more encompassing.142 This broader definition,
however, should not be determinative for two reasons. First, the
BIA Indian hiring preference and the ICWA only apply to federally
recognized tribes.143 There are only 574 federally recognized
tribes.144 The exact number of non-federally recognized Indian
tribes is unknown, but the number is substantial.145 In fact, in 2012,
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported the
existence of around 400 non-federally recognized tribes.146
Accordingly, the ICWA, like Mancari, “operates to exclude many
individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’”147 Second,
the Fifth Circuit notes in Brackeen that the “Indian child” definition
is not based solely on race or tribal ancestry because the definition
refrains from defining tribal membership requirements. 148 Instead,
tribes have the right to form their own membership laws. 149 Thus,
federally recognized tribes may extend membership to any child
141. Id. at 550.
142. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (defining “Indian child” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of
an Indian tribe”).
143. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (stating the BIA Indian hiring preference
applies “only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8)
(defining “Indian tribe”).
144. See Tribal Nations & the United States: An Introduction, NAT’L CONG. OF AM.
INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-tribes [https://perma.cc/JEB4-W8QW].
145. Christopher M. Drake, From Invisibility to Liminality: The Imposition of
Identity Among Non-federally Recognized Tribes Within the Federal
Acknowledgement Process 15 (Jan. 5, 2018) (unpublished M.A. thesis, City
University of New York) (on file with CUNY Academic Works) (“The exact number
of non-federally recognized tribes is not known. According to Russell Thornton’s
analysis of the 1990 census, only 60% of those identifying as American Indian
belonged to a federally recognized tribe.”).
146. Id. at 15.
147. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555 n.24.
148. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 428 (5th Cir. 2019); see also 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4).
149. See discussion supra note 115; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
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they wish, whether or not the child has Indian blood.150 In sum, the
ICWA’s “Indian child” definition should be considered a political
classification because it aligns with Mancari.
In Rice v. Cayetano, plaintiffs claimed that a Hawaii statute,
which only allowed “Hawaiians”151 the right to vote for state
trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), violated the
Fifteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.152 The Court held the Hawaii election
preferences violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Further, the Court
refrained from acknowledging a Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection violation, yet effectively applied a Fourteenth
Amendment analysis, insisting that “[t]he State’s electoral
restriction enacts a race-based voting qualification.”153 The Rice
holding sets a new limitation on political classifications that
implicate race: If political classifications are employed in
democratic electoral processes, the classification, even if presenting
a previously non-suspect classification, will be considered a suspect
race-based classification and violate the Fifteenth Amendment. 154
Therefore, Rice complicates political classifications, forcing analysis
of the activity in which the racial group is engaged and raising
uncertainty about the future protection that racial groups, like
Indians, will be afforded through political classifications.
The Rice holding does not control Brackeen for two reasons.
First, the definitions of “Native Hawaiian” and “Hawaiian” in
Hawaii’s voting preference, unlike the ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child,” immediately excluded all individuals who did not fit into the
ancestral classification from voting.155 As discussed in further detail
above in the “Statutory Text” section,156 the ICWA’s definition of
“Indian child” operates much differently, allotting each Indian tribe
discretion in their membership eligibility requirements.157 The
ICWA’s definition invites Indian tribes to evaluate who they view
150. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 428.
151. Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 3 MICH. L.
REV. 491, 497 (2000) (defining “Native Hawaiian” as “any descendant of not less than
one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
1778”).
152. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000).
153. Id. at 517.
154. Id. at 495–96.
155. Id. at 514–17 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race . . . . Ancestral tracing of this
sort achieves its purpose by creating a legal category which employs the same
mechanisms, and causes the same injuries, as laws or statutes that use race by
name.”).
156. See supra section II.B.i.
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
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as an “Indian child.”158 Second, the Court dismissed the State’s
argument that the Hawaii voting preference should receive the
same political classification that the Indian hiring preference in
Mancari was assigned. The Court acknowledged that the Court and
Congress have a long history of recognizing special status and
preferences for Indians, and the Court displays hesitancy to apply
that special status—particularly the political classification—to
Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians.159 Unlike Rice, Brackeen
addresses an issue related to Indians,160 and the Court has
historically allotted special preferences for Indians. Thus, Mancari,
not Rice, should control Brackeen, and the Court should hold that
the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is a political classification
subject to rational basis review.
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit’s original holding in Brackeen
v. Bernhardt was correct. The ICWA’s statutory text, legislative
history, and precedent all support the finding that the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” is a political classification. Upon
rehearing the case, the Fifth Circuit should affirm its prior holding,
classifying the ICWA’s “Indian child” definition as political.
III. A Call to Congress: The ICWA’s “Indian Child”
Definition Deserves to Be Revisited
The ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” has not been amended
since enactment in 1978. 161 Congress should revisit the ICWA to
improve the effectiveness of the statute. Protecting Indian culture
should remain at the forefront of discussion, but everyone—
Representatives, Senators, social workers, and Indians—should
contribute to reach an improved ICWA. The ICWA must better
serve the interests of Indian children. There must be a preferable
solution that offers: 1) continued preservation of Indian culture; 2)
158. Id.
159. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518–19 (describing Congress’ long history and ability to
afford Indians special treatment under the law).
160. Native Hawaiians are not considered “Indians” in the eyes of the federal
government, which does not maintain any government-to-government relationship
with Native Hawaiians as it would with a federally-recognized tribe. See Michael
Grass, As Feds Hold Hearings, Native Hawaiians Press Sovereignty Claims, ROUTE
FIFTY (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.route-fifty.com/management/2014/08/hawaiisovereignty-department-interior-hearings/91247/ [https://perma.cc/X4KH-SEEE];
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Considers Procedures to
Reestablish a Government-to-Government Relationship with the Native Hawaiian
Community (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interiorconsiders-procedures-to-reestablish-a-government-to-government-relationshipwith-the-native-hawaiian-community [https://perma.cc/7UCM-GABP].
161. 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
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greater deference to Indian parents’ regarding how their children
are raised; and 3) Indian children more avenues for adequate
homes. This Note is a call to reexamine, amend, and advocate for an
improved “Indian child” definition and an improved ICWA. This
section provides themes to be considered upon revisiting the ICWA.
A. Burden of Proof
The ICWA imposes a higher burden of proof to terminate
parental rights of Indian children from troubling home situations
than non-Indian children from similar situations.162 The ICWA
requires a finding “supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child”
to terminate parental rights of an “Indian child.”163 Unlike the
burden of proof required under the ICWA, in Santosky v. Kramer,
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” requirement found in the ICWA to non-Indian cases because
“the psychiatric evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment
proceedings is rarely susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.”164 Because of the broadness of the ICWA’s definition of
“Indian child,” many Indian children struggle from limited
protection under the ICWA. Thus, as Congress reevaluates the
ICWA and its definition of “Indian child,” Congress should consider
the high burden of proof required to remove Indian children from
troubling situations. But Congress must also remember that these
higher burdens of proof regarding removal of “Indian children” were
implemented in response to the disproportionately high number of
Indian children being removed from their families, threatening
Indian culture. 165

162. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (stating that the placement of an “Indian child”
in foster care requires a finding of “clear and convincing evidence, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by
the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child”), and § 1912(f) (stating that termination of parental rights over
an “Indian child” requires the same finding, but “supported by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt,” with Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (declining to
adopt the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to terminate non-Indian parental
rights).
163. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
164. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–69.
165. S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 1 (1977).
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B. Geography and Blood Quantum
Congress should reconsider the ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child” in light of tribes’ changing tribal enrollment requirements
and geographic locations. There are 574 federally recognized
American Indian tribes.166 Of the nearly 5.2 million Indians in the
U.S., as of 2010, only about 22 percent lived on Indian reservations
or other trust lands, leaving 78 percent of Indians geographically
distanced from their tribal lands.167 Regardless of their geographic
location, each child who qualifies as an “Indian child” remains
subject to the ICWA because the child’s tribe always has a right to
intervene at any point or invalidate a termination of parental rights
and foster care placement.168 Thus, children with little to no
preexisting ties to their Indian heritage are subject to the ICWA’s
stringent restrictions.
Not all Indian tribes have blood quantum enrollment
requirements,169 and each Indian tribe has the right to determine
the minimum blood quantum requirement should they choose to
implement the requirement.170 Due to high levels of interracial
marriages and relationships throughout the years, Indian blood
quanta have weakened,171 excluding countless Indians from tribal
enrollment as they are unable to meet their particular tribe’s
specific blood quantum enrollment requirements. In response,
tribes have begun discussions regarding loosening tribal enrollment
requirements to allow more Indians to qualify, implicating
individuals geographically distanced from tribes. 172 While
166. See Tribal Nations & the United States: An Introduction, supra note 144.
167. See Living Conditions, supra note 113.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
169. See, e.g., CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“All citizens of the Cherokee
Nation must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on the
Dawes Commission Rolls . . . .”).
170. Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The Reliance on Minimum
Blood Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in the Allotment Acts
and the Post-adoptive Couple Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA, 43
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 801, 805 (2017).
171. See Haeyoun Park, Who Is Marrying Whom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/01/29/us/20110130
mixedrace.html?ref=us [https://perma.cc/93PU-BZ6C] (demonstrating that Native
Americans have the highest rate of interracial marriage of all studied racial groups).
172. See Nicole MartinRogers & Tom Gillaspy, Minnesota Chippewa Tribe
Population Projections: Methodology Report, WILDER RESCH. 8 (May 2014),
https://www.mnchippewatribe.org/pdf/MCT%20Methodology%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8XV-RHQG]. The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe conducted a study
to examine population projections and membership requirements. The study found
that over 28,000 individuals are “multi-race American Indian with some relationship
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expanding tribal enrollment requirements may be beneficial to
tribes and some newly qualifying individuals, expansion will likely
place more Indian children under the ICWA umbrella from more
remote geographic locations.173 Therefore, the less stringent tribal
enrollment requirements are, the more remote connections
individuals will have to their eligible tribes.174 Challenges to the
ICWA regarding children with minute blood quantum levels and
few ties to tribes will likely increase upon tribal enrollment
expansions as more children will fall under the ICWA umbrella.
Thus, Congress must consider trends in Indians’ geographic
locations as well as implications for expansive tribal enrollment
requirements upon revisiting the ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child.”
Conversely, Congress should also consider that as more
Indians are distanced further from their tribes, both due to
geography and blood quantum, there is a greater need than ever to
retain the broad definition of “Indian child” to protect Indian
culture.
C. The ICWA’s Deterrence Effect
The ICWA enforces a preference system for adopting or
fostering Indian children that aims to place the children with other
Indian families.175 However, too often, there are not enough Indian
foster families across the nation, forcing tribes to place the children
in non-Indian homes.176 Unfortunately, the difficulties the ICWA
to the Chippewa” who live in the five-state area (Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Michigan) but who are not enrolled Chippewa members. It is
projected that about 50% of these 28,451 non-enrolled individuals are likely eligible
under the tribe’s current one-quarter blood quantum enrollment requirement. If,
however, the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe lowers the enrollment minimum to a oneeighth requirement, about 75% of these individuals would likely qualify for
enrollment. Chippewa tribal members recognize that their culture cannot be carried
on without a tribe, thus the Chippewa Tribe is considering its options.
173. Id. at 7 (stating that if the Minnesota Chippewa tribe expands tribal
enrollment requirements, the number of Indian adults and children implicated
within the five-state area could dramatically increase).
174. See Fain & Nagle, supra note 170, at 810 (quoting Complaint, A.D. v.
Washburn, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz. July 26, 2017) (No. 2:15-CV-01259-NVW))
(“[I]n many instances, children with only a minute quantum of Indian blood and no
connection or ties to the tribe are subject to ICWA and relegated to the tribe’s
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.”).
175. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under
State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members
of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”).
176. See Debra Utacia Krol, Inside the Native American Foster Care Crisis Tearing
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imposes on non-Indian individuals adopting Indian children, such
as the tribe’s unconditional right to intervene in “Indian child”
adoptions, deters non-Indian individuals from fostering Indian
children.177 Therefore, Congress should discuss the ICWA’s
potential deterrence effect upon fostering Indian children and its
potential ramifications on Indian children upon review of the
ICWA’s “Indian child” definition. During these deliberations,
Congress might consider narrowing the ICWA’s definition of
“Indian child”178 or amending and limiting the scope of tribal ability
to intervene in any foster care or adoption proceeding regarding an
“Indian child.”179
D. Policy Propositions
Improving the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” should be a
joint effort between Indian leaders and Congress. Protecting Indian
culture is essential, and the ICWA attempts to act as a protective
guide; however, it is flawed. Without sufficient support
mechanisms, Indian foster homes, and resources, the statute cannot
perform as intended. There must be a better way to ensure
protection and preservation of Indian culture while also placing a
stronger emphasis on the best interests of Indian children. Without
further explanation, Judge Amy Pellman, a family law judge in Los
Angeles stated, “some tweaks in the law” might fix the ICWA’s
challenges.180 Although there is consensus that the ICWA is flawed,
the mode to remedy the flaws is unclear. What is clear, though, is
that jointly, Congress and Indians should review the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” and discuss its positive and negative
effects on Indian culture and Indian children.
Families Apart, VICE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a34g8j/
inside-the-native-american-foster-care-crisis-tearing-families-apart
[https://perma.cc/6C6Q-P3WA] (“With a disproportionate number of Native kids
removed from their homes each year, the need for Native foster homes is huge—and
there aren’t enough to meet the need. That shortage leads to non-Native foster
parents taking in kids from tribal communities. Sometimes, those foster parents
decide they want to adopt the foster child even though the law is supposed to prevent
virtually all such non-Native adoptions. This has led to nasty fights over custody[.]”).
177. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent case regarding the ICWA, the Court
recognized the ICWA’s potential deterrence effect regarding adoption of Indian
children and sought to mitigate those negative consequences. Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 653–54 (2013).
178. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
179. § 1911(c).
180. See Gabby Deutch, A Court Battle Over a Dallas Toddler Could Decide the
Future of Native American Law, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/indian-child-welfare-actsuncertain-future/582628/ [https://perma.cc/V9P3-JN63].
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The parties may consider the following when discussing
potential amendments to the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child.” If
the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” was narrowed by striking or
limiting part (b),181 the “eligibility” provision, Congress might
consider publishing a formal document encouraging and requesting
the foster care system to work together and form strong alliances
with Indian tribes to carry out goals that preserve Indian culture
while also acting in the best interests of Indian children. For
example, tribes and state and tribal foster care systems can offer
Indian cultural education sessions for Indian children placed in
non-Indian homes and sessions for non-Indian foster and adoptive
parents. These cultural education sessions could teach the children
and adults about an Indian child’s particular tribal history as well
as Indian culture and history more generally. Additionally, the
tribes and state and tribal foster care systems could organize
support groups or big-brother/big-sister type relationships for
Indian children placed with non-Indian parents to explore their
cultural ties.
If, however, the definition of “Indian child” is not adapted,
Congress might add a provision to the ICWA allowing parents of a
qualifying “Indian child” an election right to opt out of the ICWA. A
provision of this type relates to the issue presented in Miss. Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. As aforementioned, in Holyfield,
the Indian parents purposefully left the reservation to give birth to
their twins in hopes that their children would not be considered
domiciled on the reservation and the ICWA would not apply. 182
Regardless of the parents’ purposeful actions to avoid the ICWA,
the Court held that the twins, who were adopted by a non-Indian
couple, fell subject to the ICWA. 183 An amendment of this nature
would offer parents autonomy over their children’s future, which to
a certain extent, the ICWA’s current form prevents. Additionally,
as discussed above, Congress might also consider an amendment
that lowers the currently demanding burden of proof the ICWA
requires to remove Indian children to temporary foster care and to
terminate parental rights. The goal behind these propositions is to
sustain the ICWA’s emphasis on protecting Indian culture while
also finding a happy medium regarding the best interests of Indian
children.

181. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b).
182. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37–39 (1989).
183. Id. at 53.
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These propositions require more discussion and evaluation;
however, they demonstrate ideas aiming to support Indian cultural
preservation and improve the ICWA’s treatment and applicability
to the “Indian child.” Again, reviewing and improving the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” must be a joint effort between Indian
leaders and Congress.
Conclusion
American Indians have historically faced cruelty at the hands
of the U.S. government comparable to the type of cruelty the U.S.
ferociously fought against in World War II. 184 Addressing the U.S.’
past failure to respect and preserve American Indian culture cannot
and should not be forgotten. The ICWA works to preserve Indian
culture.185 Without it, many “[t]ribes fear that invalidating the
ICWA on a racial basis has the potential to create a domino effect,
bringing down the rest of American Indian law with it.”186 However,
the ICWA has faults that require attention. There must be a better
solution.
This Note examines a recent Fifth Circuit case, Brackeen v.
Bernhardt, which challenges the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child”
on equal protection grounds, claiming the definition is race-based,
and therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.187 The Fifth Circuit
correctly overturned the District Court, holding that the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” is a political classification, not a racebased classification, and therefore, subject to rational basis
review.188 The ICWA’s statutory text, legislative history, and
precedent indicate that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” was
designed with a particular political purpose: protecting Indian
culture and Indian children. The Fifth Circuit’s holding that the
definition of “Indian child” is a political classification allows Indian
children to receive the special protections they deserve. It is,
however, the U.S. government’s and Indian leaders’ responsibilities
184. See Hitler Studied U.S. Treatment of Indians, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/hitler-studied-u-streatment-of-indians-pYDkk-692Ei3XkztuwKVhg [https://perma.cc/F3VC-SHAX]
(explaining that Hitler studied U.S. policies implemented against Indians as models
for how he would treat Jewish people); see also ZIIBIWING CTR. OF ANISHINABE
CULTURE & LIFEWAYS, AMERICAN INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOLS: AN E XPLORATION OF
GLOBAL ETHNIC & CULTURAL CLEANSING 18 (2011) [https://perma.cc/27CY-GVJQ]
(describing Hitler’s admiration and knowledge of the Indian boarding schools,
genocide, and internment camps organized by the U.S.).
185. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (stating the ICWA’s purpose).
186. See Deutch, supra note 180.
187. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 425–26 (5th Cir. 2019).
188. Id. at 429.
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to ensure these special protections do not disadvantage Indian
children along the way. I do not have the answer to solve the issues
facing the ICWA’s definition of an “Indian child.” However, growing
up in a rural community within twenty miles of two Indian
Reservations and observing close friends fostering Indian children,
I have seen Indian culture regaining strength through its youth; but
I have also seen the ICWA fail to protect Indian children. The
conversation regarding the ICWA and the ICWA’s definition of
“Indian child” must be reignited for the sake of both Indian culture
and Indian children. Negative consequences resulting from the
ICWA and its definition of “Indian child” will not cease without
conversation, decisions, and cooperation. Congress owes this effort
to American Indians and their culture.

